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AN AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FOR RETIREMENT PLANS? 
 
AMY B. MONAHAN* 
 
*** 
 
In the United States, the availability of tax subsidies for retirement savings 
is largely based on an individual’s employment status and whether such 
individual’s employer has voluntarily chosen to offer a tax-favored savings 
vehicle.  Even where an individual has access to an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, such plans are too often suboptimally designed.  This 
article proposes an incremental reform that ensures universal access to 
tax-favored retirement savings irrespective of employment status or 
employer decisions.  Borrowing from the model of the Affordable Care Act, 
the article calls for the creation of an optional, universally available 
retirement plan, which would be designed according to both retirement 
savings and behavioral best practices.  Such a plan would be designed to 
increase the number of Americans saving for retirement, as well as the 
likelihood that individuals will accumulate sufficient savings to maintain 
their standard of living throughout retirement.  After discussing the design 
details for such a plan, the article concludes by examining the legal and 
practical challenges of implementing a universal retirement plan at either 
the federal or state level. 
 
*** 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 Given the current challenges of implementing the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), it is perhaps unwise to suggest that the ACA’s model should be 
replicated in the retirement plan context, as the title of this article suggests.   
However, the basic structure of the ACA, which provides all Americans 
with access to health insurance regardless of their employment status or 
their employer’s choices, provides a promising model for enhancing 
retirement savings and security. 
 Many Americans are ill equipped for their retirement, having failed 
to save a sufficient amount to maintain their standard of living in 
                                                                                                                 
*Julius E. Davis Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful 
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Defined Contribution World” symposium at the University of Connecticut School 
of Law who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
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retirement.1 Much blame for this failure has been placed on the widespread 
shift in the design of employer-sponsored retirement plans.2 Instead of 
being offered traditional, defined benefit pension plans that offer a set level 
of lifetime income, most employees are now offered only a defined 
contribution plan, usually in the form of a 401(k) plan.3 These defined 
contribution plans depend for their success on individual participants 
making rational decisions and executing them in a timely manner.  Yet, 
there is significant evidence suggesting that many individuals fail to make 
rational decisions and implement them in a timely manner.  As one 
prominent scholar succinctly put it, “It’s crazy that we ended up with this 
as our retirement system.”4 The popular 401(k) plans, she explained, were 
meant to supplement traditional forms of lifetime income, such as social 
security and defined benefit pension plans.5 “It was supposed to be money 
that you could use to go to Paris.  Instead, it’s become our basic system.”6  
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The EBRI Retirement 
Readiness Rating: Retirement Income Preparation and Future Prospects, 334 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645412 (estimating that 47.2% of early baby 
boomers are at risk of not having sufficient resources to pay for basic retirement 
expenditures and uninsured health costs). One large administrator of 401(k) plans 
recently reported that average 401(k) plan balances for those age 65-69 were 
$136,800. Jill Schlesinger, The Latest on America’s 401(k)s, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 
2013, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-27/business/sns-
201302271600--tms--retiresmctnrs-a20130227-20130227_1_retirement-savings-
fidelity-plans-fidelity-investments. 
2 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 
YALE L.J. 451 (2004); James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 13 ELDER L.J. 285 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time 
to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 305 (2007). 
3 Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Asset Allocation, 2010, 
34 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 9, 11 (2013), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04_Apr-13_CDHPs-RetPart1.pdf (finding that among 
working heads of households who participated in an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, 18.9% participated only in a defined benefit plan, 65% 
participated only in a defined contribution plan, and 16.1% participated in both). 
4 Jeff Sommer, Suddenly, Many Nest Eggs Look Fragile, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/your-money/suddenly-retiree-nest-eggs 
-look-more-fragile.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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 While the problems associated with individual retirement savings 
decisions are well documented, this article seeks to highlight another 
weakness of our current reliance on 401(k) plans to deliver retirement 
security – suboptimal employer decision-making.  Our retirement savings 
system relies on employers voluntarily offering retirement plans.  Some 
employees do not have access to tax-favored retirement savings plans 
simply because their employer does not offer one.  And even when 
employers do offer a plan, they often offer a plan that is not well-designed 
to help participants accumulate sufficient retirement savings.  These plans 
often minimize employer costs while failing to take into account the 
abundant literature on 401(k) plan designs that can help overcome some of 
the well-known weaknesses in individual retirement savings decisions.  To 
address the potential problems with employer decision-making in the 
401(k) plan context, this article suggests both federal and state solutions 
that borrow from the ACA model for health insurance to ensure that all 
Americans who wish to save for retirement have a well-designed option 
available to them in the event their employer either fails to offer a plan or 
offers a plan that is suboptimally designed.  The goal of this proposal is to 
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding retirement 
saving and also suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design. 
 
II.      WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT MODEL OF RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS 
  
The weaknesses in individual decision-making within participant-
directed 401(k) plans are well documented.  Individuals struggle to begin 
saving at an early enough age to meet their retirement goals, they often fail 
to contribute sufficient amounts, and have difficulty navigating investment 
and distribution options.  Less appreciated is the fact that many employers 
make poor decisions when they design their 401(k) plans.  This Part will 
review the weaknesses in the 401(k) plan model that might explain why so 
few Americans appear to be able to achieve financial security through such 
plans. 
 
 A.  INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING  
 
 Section 401(k) plans are premised on classic economic theory, 
which posits that welfare will be optimized where each individual makes 
his or her own rational savings and consumption decisions within a fully 
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functioning market.7 The success of a 401(k) plan in providing adequate 
retirement income depends on an individual making several important 
decisions: whether and when to participate in the plan, what amount of 
salary to defer to the plan, where to invest plan contributions, when (if at 
all) to access retirement savings prior to retirement, and the rate at which to 
withdraw savings once retirement age has been reached.  If an individual is 
perfectly rational, this type of retirement plan should work very well, as it 
can be customized to match the individual’s preferences.8 
 We have good reason to believe, however, that most individuals 
are not perfectly rational and do not make optimal decisions within the 
401(k) plan context.9 These problems with participant-level decision-
making have been well documented elsewhere,10 and therefore this article 
provides only a high-level overview of the key findings.  For plans that 
require an individual to take affirmative action to enroll in the plan, 
participants often procrastinate in implementing the decision to participate, 
thereby shortening the period of time they are saving for retirement.11 In 
addition, many studies have shown that once individuals elect to participate 
they are overwhelmed by the decisions they are required to make, such as 
selecting a contribution level and making investment decisions, and 
therefore stick to the defaults or allow the plan’s framing of choices to 
                                                                                                                 
7 See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and 
Other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 480–81 (2004). 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (David 
A. Wise ed., 2004); Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and 
Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and 
Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. 
Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 81 (2007); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of 
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 
1149 (2001); Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance for Retirement Plan Design (Pension Research Council, Working Paper 
No. 2003-6, 2003). For a helpful overview of the literature on retirement savings 
decisions, see Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and 
Behavioral Decision Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. 
SEC. BULL. 1 (2010).  
10 See sources cited supra note 9. 
11 Knoll, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
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impact their decisions.12 There is also strong evidence that hyperbolic 
discounting affects retirement savings decisions causing individuals to give 
more weight to current consumption than to future needs, thereby under-
saving for retirement.13 Many studies have shown that simply changing 
plan defaults results in dramatic changes in behavior – which would not be 
predicted under standard economic theory.14 According to standard 
economic theory, a rational decision-maker will simply opt out of any 
defaults that do not maximize her preferences.15 Yet, the evidence on the 
impact of defaults in the retirement savings context suggests that cognitive 
biases are impacting many individuals’ decision-making.16 
 
 B.   EMPLOYER DECISION-MAKING 
 
 A less explored weakness inherent in relying on 401(k) plans to 
provide retirement security is the fact that they depend on sound employer 
decision-making.17  In theory, employers should act as effective agents for 
their employees and offer retirement plans that maximize their employees’ 
preferences.18  But there are various reasons why employers may not, in 
fact, offer plans designed to produce adequate retirement income.  The 
subparts below illustrate the ways in which employer decision-making can 
negatively impact employees’ retirement security. 
 
 1.  Failing to Offer a Plan 
 
 Employers are not required to offer any type of retirement plan to 
their workers.  It is a completely voluntary decision, driven by labor market 
                                                                                                                 
12 See, e.g., Agnew & Szykman, supra note 9, at 66; Choi et al., supra note 9, 
at 125. 
13 See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 
Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997). 
14 See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 9. 
15 See id. at 81. 
16 See id. See also Madrian & Shea, supra note 9. 
17 For an examination of the role of employers in employees’ health and 
retirement security, see Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 751 (2014). 
18 See Gregory Acs & Eugene Steuerle, The Corporation as Dispenser of 
Welfare and Security, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY: EXAMINING THE 
QUESTIONS OF POWER AND EFFICIENCY AT THE CENTURY'S END 360, 361 (Carl 
Kaysen, ed. 1996). 
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pressures.19 We would expect an employer to voluntarily offer a retirement 
plan in lieu of other forms of compensation where it believes that doing so 
will help it attract and retain workers.20 Indeed, pension formation is 
typically explained as a contract driven by worker demand to provide 
workers with security and income protection.21 But it is widely 
acknowledged that pensions also offer other benefits to employers, in 
addition to simply helping them attract and retain employees.  For example, 
pensions can help employers control their employees’ tenure and turnover 
by designing plans to encourage retirement at certain ages.22   
 But allowing labor market pressures to determine whether a 
retirement plan is offered has shortcomings.  It aggregates the preferences 
of employees.  If the majority of employees of a given employer do not 
value retirement benefits, the employer is unlikely to offer a plan.  For 
those minority employees that would value a retirement plan, their only 
option would be to find a different employer that offers the desired 
benefits.  Because many factors enter into a decision to work at one firm 
over another, it may be that many who desire a retirement plan are not 
offered one.  And bear in mind that a job switch is in fact the only complete 
solution if an employee’s current employer fails to offer a retirement plan.  
While there are individual tax-favored retirement accounts available 
outside of the employment context, none can duplicate the extent of the tax 
benefits available to employer plans.  An employee can currently defer up 
to $17,500 of her salary tax-free per year to a 401(k) plan,23 but can only 
contribute $5,500 annually to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).24 
 Prior to health care reform, we saw the same dynamic at play in an 
employer’s decision to offer a health plan to employees.  Employers 
                                                                                                                 
19 See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 2 (1992). 
20 See Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A 
Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 417, 426 (1994). 
21 GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19. For alternative explanations of pension 
formation, see id. at 2–7. 
22 Id. at 2–3. 
23 I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations;-Taxpayers-May-Contribute-up-
to-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014. Participants who are age fifty or older 
are permitted to contribute an addition $5,500 each year, for a total of $23,000 per 
year.  Id. 
24 Id. Participants who are age fifty or older may contribute an additional 
$1,000 per year to an IRA, for a total annual contribution of $6,500. Id. 
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decided to offer a health plan based on labor market pressures,25 and 
employees had little ability to replicate the benefits of an employer plan by 
seeking individual level coverage.26 Health care reform will change this 
reliance on employers, as discussed in more detail in Part II. 
 
 2.  Offering a Suboptimal Plan 
 
 Even if an employer offers a retirement plan, it may nevertheless 
be the case that an employer offers a plan that, from an employee’s 
perspective, is suboptimally designed.  Employers offer retirement plans in 
order to recruit and retain valued workers.  Retirement plans help recruit 
and retain workers when workers find them to be a positive addition to 
their compensation package.  Employers should therefore structure their 
retirement plans in a way that employees find attractive.27 In other words, 
we would expect employers to be effective agents for their employees 
when they design their retirement plans.28 Employees, however, are 
unlikely to be familiar with all of the features of their retirement plan, and 
are likely, when evaluating an employer plan, to focus on only a few 
features that are highly salient to employees.29 For example, it seems 
plausible that employees would focus on whether a plan is offered at all, 
and the amount and structure of any employer contributions to the plan, 
such as matching or profit sharing contributions.  Most employees, when 
deciding whether to accept or retain an offer of employment from a firm, 
probably do not examine plan details such as plan defaults, the quality of 
plan investments, investment fees, or forms of distribution.  If employers 
believe or discover that employees focus only on a handful of highly salient 
features, employers are likely to respond by structuring their plans only 
around those features and otherwise acting to minimize their costs.  For 
example, an employer might offer a 401(k) plan with a matching 
                                                                                                                 
25 See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Quality and Employers' Choice 
of Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 471, 472 (2004). 
26 See Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health 
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1944 (2013). 
27 For an overview of pension theories, see GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19, at 1–
7. 
28 See Chernew et al., supra note 24, at 472. 
29 See James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 
J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 199 (1998) (discussing that increased numbers of 
alternatives facing the consumer when choosing retirement products lead to a 
greater use of non-compensatory strategies which eliminate alternatives). 
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contribution that equals or exceeds that offered by its competitor firms, but 
in order to reduce its costs associated with the plan might select a plan 
provider that offers high fee investments, defaults that do not address 
participants’ likely cognitive biases, and distribution forms that do not help 
participants manage income in retirement.  The end result may be that even 
where employers offer plans, they offer plans that are not designed to 
maximize participants’ retirement security. 
 Again, much the same dynamic is at play in how employers 
approach health plan design.  Employees are likely to focus only on highly 
salient features when evaluating a health plan – in this case on premium 
levels, copays, and whether their current doctor is in-network.30 And 
employers are likely to respond to this employee focus by designing plans 
around the highly salient features, potentially at the expense of other 
important plan design features such as the quality of the plan or providers.31 
 If this hypothesis regarding employer plan design is correct, the 
implications for retirement and health security are significant.  In the 
retirement plan context, it would mean that even if every employer made a 
401(k) plan available to its workers, the problem of insufficient retirement 
savings would not be solved.  While we know relatively little regarding 
how employer plan design decisions are made and the factors that motivate 
those design decisions, data regarding plan features provide support for the 
hypothesis that the majority of employers do not offer plans that are 
optimally designed.  Plans often have defaults that work against retirement 
savings.  Individuals that desire to participate must take active steps to 
enroll in the plan, instead of being defaulted into participation.32 Even 
where participants are automatically enrolled in a plan, default contribution 
                                                                                                                 
30 See Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65 
TAX L. REV. 749, 764–765 (2012). 
31 See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient 
Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market 
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1999) (explaining how health insurance 
companies are likely to structure health plans given consumers’ focus on only a 
handful of highly salient features). 
32 See Alicia H. Munnell, 401(k) Plans in 2010: An Update from the SCF, 
ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. C., Boston, MA), July 2012, at 1, 4, 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IB_12-13-508.pdf 
(finding that fewer than half of all 401(k) plans offered automatic enrollment in 
2010). 
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rates are often too low to provide adequate savings.33 Many plans allow 
easy access to savings prior to retirement,34 and nearly all have a lump sum 
distribution as either the default or the only form of distribution available.35  
 In addition, plans sometimes work against participants’ savings 
goals by offering poor investment choices and little investment advice.36  
As we have seen through countless class action lawsuits, many employers 
allegedly offer a menu of investments that charge excessive fees.37 
                                                                                                                 
33 See id. See also DELOITTE, ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 9 
(2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Consulting/us_cons_hc_401ksbecnchm
arkingsurvey2012.pdf (finding that the average default contribution rate was 3%, 
an amount unlikely “to support a comfortable retirement”). 
34 For example, approximately 90% of 401(k) plan participants participate in a 
plan that offers plan loans. John Beshears et al., The Availability and Utilization of 
401(k) Loans 2 (John. F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 11-023, 
2011), available at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id 
=693. Sixty-six percent of all 401(k) plans permit participants to take hardship 
distributions prior to retirement. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SECTION 401(K) 
COMPLIANCE CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE FINAL REPORT 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/401k_final_report.pdf. Studies are, however, 
mixed on the extent to which such pre-retirement access threatens retirement 
security. See generally sources cited infra note 64. 
35 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 34, at 59 (finding that 99% of 
401(k) plans offer a lump sum distribution, while only 19% offer a qualified joint 
and survivor annuity). See also HEWITT ASSOC., TRENDS AND EXPERIENCES IN 
401(K) PLANS 7 (2009) available at http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/ 
Library/Hewitt_Research_Trends_in_401k_Highlights.pdf (finding that all 401(k) 
plans offered a lump sum option, while 14% offered annuities). 
36 See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for 
Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 511–12 (2013) (examining the weaknesses of 
401(k) investment options); Karen Blumenthal, Thanks but No Thanks on 401(k) 
Advice, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204346104576638933476020932 (finding that while a 
majority of 401(k) plans offer investment advice, only around a quarter of 
participants offered some form of investment advice utilize the service).  
37 For a detailed examination of this litigation and its effects, see Mercer 
Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical 
Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 335 
(2014) and Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive 
Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans 13-20 (Feb. 
21, 2014 (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399531. See also Kelly 
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Employers often offer employer stock as an investment option, even though 
in many cases it is unwise for a participant who depends on an employer 
for her current income to invest in that employer’s stock for her long-term 
savings.38 And finally, plans are permitted to, and often do, pass along to 
participants nearly all of the administrative costs of running the plan, 
further reducing participants’ rate of return.39 
 There has been one area of plan design that has improved 
significantly over the last decade.  Beginning in the 1990s, several 401(k) 
plan sponsors began experimenting with automatic enrollment provisions, 
which provide that an eligible participant will automatically participate in 
the employer’s plan unless he or she takes affirmative action to opt out.40 
The number of employers utilizing automatic enrollment grew following 
the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which offered 
employers various incentives for putting such procedures in place.  
However, a well-known potential weakness of automatic enrollment 
provisions is that plan sponsors can choose default contribution levels and 
investment options that are too low and too conservative to produce 
adequate retirement savings.  When automatic enrollment provisions first 
gained traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s, default investment 
options were primarily conservative, capital-preserving investments.41 
However, a recent survey found that 82% of plans with automatic 
enrollment now had as their default investment option a lifecycle or target-
date fund, designed to invest appropriately given the participant’s years to 
                                                                                                                 
Greene, Letters About 401(k) Plan Costs Stir Tempest, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578626103409
341648 (describing Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres’ letter writing campaign to 
401(k) plan sponsors regarding their fee levels, and the reaction such letters have 
provoked).  
38 See generally Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant 
Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010). 
39 See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 19 (finding that 51% of plans paid all 
administrative and recordkeeping fees through investment revenue). 
40 See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of PPA on Retirement 
Savings for 401(k) Participants, 318 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 4 
(2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-20087.pdf. 
41 See PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, AUTOMATIC 
ENROLLMENT 2001: A STUDY OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT PRACTICES IN 401(K) 
PLANS available at http://www.pcsa.org/data/autoenroll2001.asp (finding that 
among plans with automatic enrollment, 66% had a conservative default 
investment option such as a stable value or money market fund). 
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retirement.42 Note, however, that this change was likely brought about by a 
change in Department of Labor regulations that protected plan fiduciaries 
from liability where they offered a “qualified investment” as the default 
investment option.43 This change does not appear to have been the result of 
employers independently making a decision to improve the quality of the 
plan’s default investment option.  As a result, this improvement does not 
provide significant evidence against the hypothesis that employers often 
lack motivation to design optimal retirement plans.  Indeed, when the state 
of 401(k) plan design is viewed as a whole, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that even when participants are lucky enough to be offered an employer-
sponsored retirement plan, that plan in many cases will not be designed to 
maximize retirement security. 
 
III.   THE ACA MODEL 
 
 While there is reason to be less than confident in our current 
retirement savings system, the structure of federal health care reform 
provides an interesting model of how dependence on employers can be 
reduced, and portions of its structure might successfully be borrowed to 
improve retirement savings.  As noted above, there are important 
similarities between employer-sponsored health and retirement plans.  Both 
types of plans depend on employer decision-making for their success.  An 
employer must decide to offer a plan if an employee is to have access to the 
benefit at all, since neither type of plan can be duplicated outside of the 
employment context.44 And the quality of the benefit provided depends in 
large part on how employers decide to structure the benefit plan.  If an 
employer makes suboptimal choices in a health plan, an individual’s health 
                                                                                                                 
42 See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 11. 
43 Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual 
Account Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008). Each of the three qualified default 
investment options is diversified in order to minimize the risk of large losses but 
also to provide long-term growth potential. 
44 Health plans, like retirement plans, depend on employer sponsorship for the 
individual to receive the most favorable tax treatment. If an employee buys health 
insurance on her own, she must pay for the coverage with after-tax dollars, 
whereas an employee who participates in an employer plan may pay premiums 
with pre-tax dollars. This tax advantage did not change with the passage of the 
ACA. In addition, purchasing coverage through an employer gives the employee 
access to group coverage, which tends to be more affordable than individual 
coverage.  See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 1942–44. 
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security can be jeopardized, much the same way an individual’s retirement 
security can be compromised if an employer designs a suboptimal 
retirement plan. 
 For health plans, however, this should begin to change as the major 
reforms of the ACA take effect.45 Once the ACA’s provisions are fully 
effective, individuals who are not offered health coverage through an 
employer, or are offered a plan that does not satisfy their preferences, 
should have a meaningful coverage alternative.  Such individuals can freely 
purchase any individual coverage available on their state’s health insurance 
exchange46 and, assuming these markets function well post-reform, should 
have a broad variety of plan designs and premium levels from which to 
choose.47 The ACA requires all plans sold on the state exchanges (referred 
to as “qualified health plans”) to satisfy various plan design, content and 
quality requirements in order to ensure that the options available meet 
minimum standards.48 In other words, one underappreciated function of the 
ACA is to act as a backstop for employer choices that might be suboptimal 
from an employee’s perspective.  While not perfect (an employee 
purchasing health insurance on an exchange would have to purchase 
coverage with after-tax instead of pre-tax dollars), the ACA should give an 
individual a much greater ability to secure desired health care coverage 
without regard to his or her employer’s choices.49 For example, if an 
employee is offered health insurance coverage by her employer that has a 
deductible too high for the employee to afford, or that fails to offer a broad 
network of providers, that employee is no longer effectively stuck with 
what the employer offers, but will instead have the option of going to her 
state’s health insurance exchange and buying coverage that satisfies her 
preferences. 
 The ACA’s provision of a universal option available to all 
individuals without regard to employment status or employer decision-
making provides an interesting model that might be of use in improving 
retirement security in the United States.  Part IV below explores ways in 
                                                                                                                 
45 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
46 See 42 U.S.C. 18031(b) (Supp. V 2012). 
47 See 42 U.S.C. 18022 (Supp. V 2012). 
48 See id. 
49 For a discussion of some of the implications of these choices, see Brendan 
S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choice, Defaults, and the 
Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099 (2012). 
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which both the federal and state governments could borrow from the ACA 
to provide a meaningful alternative to suboptimal employer-sponsored 
retirement plans. 
 
IV.   A UNIVERSAL BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
 Both the federal and state governments have the ability to use law 
to improve retirement security for many Americans.  This Part begins by 
exploring the use of a universal “backstop” retirement plan, similar to the 
concept of a qualified health plan under the ACA, which could help to 
address the problem of flawed employer decision-making.  It then discusses 
the possibilities and impediments associated with establishing such a 
backstop at either the federal or state level. 
 
 A.  BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN DESIGN 
 
 There are myriad problems in our current retirement savings 
system.  Employer plans provide the greatest tax benefit for retirement 
savings, but are far from universal.50 Even when employer plans are 
available, they are often not designed to address the well-documented 
mistakes that individuals make in their retirement savings decisions.51 
While there are Individual Retirement Accounts universally available, these 
savings vehicles have much lower contribution limits than employer-
sponsored plans,52 involve even more complex participant decision-making 
                                                                                                                 
50 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS., 
2013 RCS FACT SHEET #3, at 5 (2013), available at  http://ebri.org/pdf/surveys/ 
rcs/2013/Final-FS.RCS-13.FS_3.Saving.FINAL.pdf. (reporting that only 72% of 
workers are offered a retirement plan by their employer); See Emp. Benefit 
Research Inst., Pension Plan Participation, FAST FACTS (Emp. Benefit Research 
Inst., Washington, D.C.), March 28, 2013, available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/FF.225.DB-DC.28Mar13.pdf. (finding that in 2011, 3% of private sector 
workers participated in a defined benefit plan, 11% participated in both a defined 
benefit and defined contribution plan, and 31% participated only in a defined 
contribution plan). 
51 See supra Part II.B.2. 
52 See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671 (stating that in 2013, 
individuals can contribute $17,500 to an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan, but can 
contribute only $5,500 to an IRA). 
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than employer plans,53 and are not designed to counteract cognitive biases 
in retirement savings decisions.54 
 There are many ways to address the perceived shortcomings of our 
current system.  We could reform Social Security so that it provided more 
complete income replacement in retirement.  We could implement a 
government-sponsored, universal pension plan.  We could raise 
contribution limits on IRAs.  The proposal offered in this article is an 
incremental reform that is based on the premise that 401(k) plans, and 
defined contribution retirement plans in general, are here to stay and that a 
wholesale shift away from either defined contribution plans or employer-
provided plans is unlikely to be politically viable.  Instead, the universal 
backstop retirement plan is designed to work within the existing employer-
based system to ensure that all individuals have access to a quality 
retirement plan designed to maximize the likelihood that a participant will 
have adequate income in retirement.  The goal is, as best we can, to 
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding saving and 
investing and suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design. 
 As the ACA will do for health plans, the idea of a backstop 
retirement plan is to have a plan available to all individuals, regardless of 
whether they are employed or have access to other retirement plans through 
an employer.  It is offering a new option, not supplanting the existing 
system.  One significant advantage of this type of reform is that it lets the 
backstop plan compete against employer offerings.  It lets participants 
choose the plan that best meets their needs.  In this way, a backstop 
retirement plan is superior to direct regulation of employer plan offerings.  
Employers remain free to design a plan that best meets the needs of their 
                                                                                                                 
53 The decision-making process to establish and fund an IRA is more 
complicated than participation in a 401(k) plan because there are a greater number 
of options. An IRA can be established with numerous investment firms, in contrast 
to an employer that would offer only a single plan. And once an IRA provider is 
selected, an individual can essentially invest her contributions in any publicly 
traded security – making the investment decision more complex compared with a 
401(k) plan that often offers a limited menu of investment options. 
54 Because IRAs must be initiated and established by an individual, design 
features such as automatic enrollment, automatically increasing contribution rates, 
and default investment options typically cannot be utilized. This could change if 
the law required the establishment of so-called payroll IRAs or automatic IRAs, 
recently proposed by President Obama. See Retirement Security for American 
Families, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/ 
Retirement_Savings_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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employees, or even forgo a plan, but employees will not bear any ill 
consequences of the employer’s decision.  In fact, the backstop retirement 
plan may incent some employers to improve their plan offerings.  It is 
possible, of course, that employers may drop their retirement plans if a 
backstop retirement plan becomes available.  It is important to note that this 
is not necessarily a bad outcome, if the backstop plan is appropriately 
designed.  Employers dropping retirement plans is only problematic if their 
doing so leaves employees worse off with respect to retirement savings.  
An appropriately designed backstop plan, as discussed in more detail 
below, should prevent such an outcome. 
While in reality designing a backstop plan would be a difficult 
process relying on input from many experts and stakeholders, I offer here 
some initial thoughts on basic approaches to the backstop plan and issues to 
be considered.  Some of the design features mentioned would require 
changes to either federal or state law, an issue I discuss in the next subpart. 
The first issue to tackle would be designing the plan to encourage 
participation.  The evidence seems clear that automatic participation, with 
the ability to opt-out, would be preferable to requiring affirmative action to 
begin saving.55 But given that this is a backstop plan, and not merely the 
plan of a single employer, implementing automatic enrollment is 
complicated.  We have three potential categories of participants: employees 
who have access to an employer-sponsored plan, employees without an 
employer plan, and self-employed individuals.  It would be easiest to 
implement automatic enrollment for employed individuals without access 
to an employer plan.  Those individuals could simply be defaulted into the 
backstop plan through required payroll deduction.  For those employees 
who are offered an employer plan, the question becomes which plan they 
should be automatically enrolled in – the backstop plan or the employer 
plan?  The best approach for an employee would depend on how the 
employer plan compares to the backstop plan, so that is of little help in 
determining the default.  One simple solution would be to default the 
employee into the backstop plan only if the employer plan does not provide 
for automatic enrollment.  For self-employed individuals, automatic 
                                                                                                                 
55 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 
S164, S169 (2004); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for 
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167–95 (Jeffrey Brown et al. 
eds., 2009). 
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enrollment is impossible to implement because payroll deduction is not 
practical.  But there are other methods to encourage participation.  Self-
employed individuals could face a small fee for failing to participate in the 
plan (or an equivalent retirement savings vehicle), or they could be 
required to state when filing their federal tax return whether they wish to 
participate in the plan, and be given the ability to direct any tax refund to 
the backstop plan.  These are not ideal, of course, but illustrations of how 
participation can be encouraged without the ease of payroll deduction. 
After tackling the issue of getting individuals into the backstop 
plan, the next design issue is contributions, both participant and employer.  
Ideally, the default contribution level for participants would be a 
percentage of wages which, if contributed over an average working life, 
and taking into account an appropriate investment return assumption, 
would result in a level of income replacement at retirement that would be 
sufficient to provide seventy to eighty percent of pre-retirement income for 
the average life expectancy.56 Obviously, such a contribution level would 
not be ideal for everyone, and in fact may be so large as to result in 
participants either dropping out of the plan entirely or lowering their 
contribution rate.57 Further study would be necessary to select a 
contribution rate that would maximize plan participation and contribution 
rates.  One possibility would be to adjust the contribution rate based on a 
                                                                                                                 
56 Financial planners often suggest that, for most individuals, retirement 
savings should aim to replace 70% to 80% of pre-retirement income, although this 
is at best a rough guide. See, e.g., Jason Jenkins, The New Rule of Thumb for 
Retirement Savings, INVESTMENT U (2012), available at http://www.investmentu. 
com/2012/October/new-rule-of-thumb-for-retirement-savings.html. For a more 
sophisticated analysis of retirement savings needs, see Jonathan Skinner, Are You 
Sure You’re Saving Enough for Retirement? (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12981, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 
12981.pdf?new_window=1. 
57 See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 55, at S169–72 (citing behavioral 
analysis which indicates that many individuals who perceive themselves as unable 
to meet current expenditures will not be interested in increasing their participation 
in savings plans if a rate above their perceived ability to save is suggested); See 
Beshears et al., supra note 55, at 171 (noting that employers often set automatic 
enrollment contribution levels low due to the commonly held belief that high 
contribution levels will encourage employees to opt out). 
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participant’s income.58 Another well-tested plan design would be to start 
participants at a low initial contribution rate, and increase that contribution 
rate automatically at specified intervals to gradually bring a participant to 
an adequate savings level.59 
It is important that employers be able to contribute to an 
employee’s account in the backstop plan.  It is easy to imagine that many 
employers would, if a backstop retirement plan were in place, no longer 
sponsor their own 401(k) plan.  But without the ability of employers to 
contribute directly to their employees’ retirement, an important source of 
savings would be lost.  Therefore, making it easy (and tax advantaged) for 
an employer to contribute to an employee’s retirement savings, whether 
through an employer-sponsored plan or the backstop plan, would be an 
important design feature. 
Assuming that participation is encouraged at an adequate savings 
rate, the next design issue, and potentially the most difficult one, is to 
determine both the default and alternative investment options.  The ideal 
default investment is likely a passive fund that offers the appropriate mix of 
risk and return characteristics appropriate for the individual’s savings 
horizon.60 Target date funds, which are designed to automatically shift the 
fund’s asset allocation as the target retirement date nears, are attractive 
because they are designed around the participant’s investment time 
horizon, and they offer one-stop shopping.61 Theoretically, a participant 
could put all of their savings in a single target date fund.  These funds are 
not without risks,62 but they may provide a better default option than others 
readily available.63 
                                                                                                                 
58 Varying contribution rates by income level may be more palatable to low-
income individuals, and could also be designed to reflect the fact that social 
security replaces a larger percentage of income for low-income individuals. 
59 A plan design with automatically increasing contribution rates was 
pioneered by economists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi. See Thaler & 
Benartzi, supra note 55. 
60 See Kwak, supra note 36. 
61 Julie R. Agnew et al., What People Know About Target-Date Funds: Survey 
and Focus Group Evidence 4 (Fin. Sec. Project at B.C., Working Paper 2011-2), 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/FSP-WP-2011-2.pdf. 
62 See Zvi Bodie et al., Unsafe at Any Speed? The Designed-in Risks of Target-
Date Glide Paths, J. FIN. PLAN. (March 15, 2010), available at http://www.fpanet 
.org/journal/CurrentIssue/TableofContents/UnsafeatAnySpeed/. 
63 Zvi Bodie et al., Life Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans, 1 
ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 249, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
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 An important issue worth considering is whether the backstop plan 
should not have participant-directed investment, but should instead operate 
as a cash balance plan, where participants are guaranteed a rate of return on 
their contributions.64 If a cash balance approach is taken, participants would 
not face significant investment risk, a distinct advantage over current 
401(k) plans.65 The price, of course, is that such plans typically have 
conservative rates of return, which may be insufficient to provide adequate 
retirement income given reasonable contribution rates.66 Another option 
would be to default participants into the cash balance plan and allow 
individuals to opt out of the cash balance plan and into a participant-
directed 401(k) plan if desired.  Doing so would allow more sophisticated 
investors to seek higher rates of return than the cash balance plan offers, 
while still offering unsophisticated or risk-adverse investors a guaranteed 
rate of return.   
 Another approach to participant investments would be to invest 
contributions in deferred life annuities, similar to a recent proposal by 
Senator Hatch for public pension plans.67 Investing contributions in 
annuities would both protect employees against investment risk and 
provide them with a guaranteed income stream at retirement.  However, 
like the cash balance option described above, such a structure would not 
necessarily guarantee that the amount of the income stream would be 
adequate. 
                                                                                                                 
abstract_id=1396835. For an interesting example of an investment option that 
utilizes both target date funds and annuities that provide a guaranteed level of 
lifetime income, see Tara Seigel Bernard, A 401(k) That Promises Never to Run 
Dry: [Your Money], N.Y. TIMES Nov. 14, 2012, at F.4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/11/14/your-money/a-401-k-that-promises-income-
for-life.html?r=0. 
64 Kevin E. Cahill & Mauricio Soto, How Do Cash Balance Plans Affect the 
Pension Landscape?, AN ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. For Ret. Research. Bos. Coll., 
Boston, MA), Dec. 2003, at 1, 1. 
65 See id. at 3; Richard W. Johnson & Cori E. Uccello, Cash Balance Plans: 
What Do They Mean For Retirement Security?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 315, 316–18 
(2004). 
66 See Cahill & Soto, supra note 64 at 3 (noting that cash balance plans on 
average offer a 5.6% rate of return, compared to a market-average rate of return of 
7.6%). 
67 See The Secure Annuities for Employees Retirement Act, S. 1270, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
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 The final major design decision concerns plan distributions, both 
before and during retirement.  Allowing easy access to retirement savings 
prior to retirement may significantly endanger retirement security.68 
However, individuals may be more likely to participate in the first place if 
they know that they can access their savings in the event of a financial 
hardship.69  To balance these competing concerns, the plan could offer pre-
retirement distributions only for specific financial hardships,70 instead of 
offering relatively unrestricted pre-retirement access as many employer 
401(k) plans do currently.71 Consideration should be given to whether pre-
retirement access should only be the form of plan loans,72 or whether an 
outright distribution will be permitted, and in what circumstances. 
 The other major design decision with respect to distributions will 
be the form of retirement distributions.  Most participants in 401(k) plans 
receive lump sum distributions.73 However, what most individuals require 
                                                                                                                 
68 See Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, 401(k) Plans Are Still Coming Up 
Short, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research Bos. C., Boston, MA), Mar. 2006, at 
1, 5, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2006/03/ib_43.pdf. 
69 The evidence regarding whether or to what extent access to funds pre-
retirement increases participation are mixed. Compare Alicia H. Munnell et al., 
What Determines 401(k) Participation and Contributions? 16 (Ctr. for Ret. 
Research Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2000-12, 2000), available at http:// 
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2000/12/wp_2000-12.pdf (“the ability to borrow 
increases the contribution rate by about 1 percentage point”), with U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE 
PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME 5 (1997), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98005.pdf (“[p]articipation rates 
in plans with loan provisions are about 6 percentage points higher than plans with 
no loan provisions”). 
70 The IRS publishes a list of “safe harbor” reasons for hardship distributions, 
which could be used in the loan context as well. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-
1(d)(3)(iii) (2011). 
71 PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AM., PLAN LOAN RESTRICTION STUDY 
(1999), available at http://www.psca.org/RESEARCHDATA/PlanLoanRestriction 
Study/tabid/176/Default.aspx (reporting that 82% of plans did not place restrictions 
on the purposes for which a plan loan would be granted). 
72 Loans have the advantage of allowing the participant to return the retirement 
savings to the plan with interest, but loan repayment may not be possible in some 
financial circumstances. 
73 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 
2749, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT PLAN 
PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 125 (2010), 
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in retirement is lifetime income.74 For this reason, having a life annuity as 
the default form of retirement distribution likely makes the most sense, 
with notice and consent required for other forms of distributions such as 
lump sum or installments.75 
 
1.  A Federal Backstop? 
 
 With the design basics in place, the next issue to consider is 
whether a backstop plan is best offered at the federal or state level.  A 
backstop retirement plan created at the federal level has some advantages 
over state-based plans.  Assuming there is political will to put such a plan 
in place, the federal government could easily pass a law establishing the 
backstop plan that has the basic design features described above.  States, on 
the other hand, would have to work around existing federal law to put such 
a plan in place, as is discussed in more detail below.  A federal plan may 
also make sense given that retirement savings goals and related plan design 
likely do not vary significantly by state, as some other types of programs 
might, and there are also likely to be economies of scale associated with a 
single backstop plan, versus fifty individual plans. 
 The biggest impediment to establishing a federal backstop plan, in 
addition to political will, is the cost.  Assuming that the backstop plan 
would involve extending the tax benefits of employer-sponsored plans to 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2009/ebbl0045.pdf 
(finding that 90% of plan participants had a lump sum distribution option, while 
27% were offered installments and 15% were offered an annuity); VANGUARD, 
DISTRIBUTION DECISIONS AMONG RETIREMENT-AGE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLAN PARTICIPANTS 6 (2010), available at https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/ 
pdf/CRRDDP.pdf (finding that only 2% of retirement-aged participants elected 
installments, whereas 47% took a lump sum distribution and the remainder left 
their account in the plan). 
74 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k) 
Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
277, 285–86 (2010) (explaining the process of managing retirement wealth to 
produce an income stream in retirement). 
75 While legislative action to require annuities does not seem imminent, the 
Department of Labor has recently proposed regulations that would require defined 
contribution plans to provide on participant’s benefit statements an estimated 
lifetime income stream based on current retirement savings. Pension Benefit 
Statements, 78 Fed. Reg. 26727, 26737–38 (proposed May 8, 2013) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2520). 
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the backstop plan, the cost of an already expensive tax expenditure would 
increase.76 Given our current fiscal realities, it may be difficult to persuade 
Congress to spend money now in order to save money on supporting 
retirees in the future. 
 One potentially revenue-neutral way to expand tax benefits to the 
backstop plan would be to lower the current 401(k) deferral limits.  In other 
words, to shift some of the current tax benefits available exclusively to 
employer-provided plans to a wider population.  While there are sound 
equity-based arguments for lowering the tax benefit but extending it to a 
wider population, objections might be raised that doing so would have the 
perverse effect of lowering existing rates of retirement savings by those in 
employer plans.  Further study would be necessary to better understand the 
effects of shifting the tax benefit.  The maximum salary deferral in 2014 is 
$17,500, but historical data shows that few participants contribute the 
maximum amount.77 Not surprisingly, the number of participants 
contributing the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan is closely correlated to 
income level.78  While twenty-eight percent of those earning $100,000 or 
more contribute the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan, only one percent of 
those earning between $40,000 and $60,000 do so.79 On average, 
participants contribute between 7.5 and 8% of their income.80 These data 
suggest that the maximum pre-tax deferral to 401(k) plans could be 
lowered without adversely affecting the majority of participants, and the 
minority that would be affected would be relatively high-income 
                                                                                                                 
76 The tax expenditure for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans is 
estimated to be $57 billion in 2013. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 39 
(Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start 
down&id=4503. 
77 See Munnell, supra note 32, at 5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See Craig Copeland, 401(k)-Type Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs), EBRI NOTES (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2007, 
at 1, 6, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_Notes_10a-2007.pdf (reporting 
average deferral rate of 7.5%); Fidelity Average 401(k) Balance Climbs to Record 
High at End of 2012, FIDELITY.COM (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.fidelity.com/ 
inside-fidelity/employer-services/fidelity-analysis-finds-record-high-average-401k-
balance (reporting 8% average annual deferral rate among Fidelity 401(k) plan 
participants). 
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participants (who are likely to save for retirement even in the absence of a 
tax benefit).81 
 Another way to address the tax issue would be to structure the plan 
as an after-tax plan.  One way to do so, which would require no change to 
tax laws, would be to have contributions to the plan be made on an after-tax 
basis and have participants subject to capital gains taxation when gains or 
losses are realized.82 Another option would be for Congress to make the 
plan operate like a Roth IRA, where contributions are after-tax, but 
distributions are tax-free.83 
 
2. A State Backstop? 
 
  Theoretically, states could take legislative action to do much the 
same thing as the federal solutions described above.  States could create 
their own state-based retirement plan available to all workers, designed to 
produce adequate income replacement for the average worker.  But 
implementing a state-based solution is difficult because of current federal 
limitations.  First, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), preempts any state law that “relates to” an employee benefit 
plan.84 Without getting into the complex details of ERISA preemption, 
suffice it to say that a state law that required employer participation in a 
retirement plan or significantly penalized an employer for failing to 
participate in a retirement plan would be preempted by ERISA.85 As a 
                                                                                                                 
81 See generally Eric M. Engen et al., The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives 
on Saving, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1996) (examining whether and to what extent 
tax incentives increase the level of retirement savings). 
82 Depending on the investment strategy pursued, conventional savings 
accounts without tax deferral can be just as tax efficient as tax-favored accounts 
that tax gains at ordinary rather than capital gains rates. See generally, John B. 
Shoven & Clemens Sialm, Asset Location in Tax-Deferred and Conventional 
Savings Accounts, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 23 (2003) (describing how locating assets 
optimally can significantly improve the risk-adjusted performance of retirement 
saving). 
83 For an overview of the relative tax advantages of Roth IRAs, see Leonard E. 
Burman et al., The Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing Between Front-
Loaded and Back-Loaded Options, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 689 (2001). 
84 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
85 For a more detailed overview of ERISA preemption in this context, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky. California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice 
Retirement Savings Trust Act, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 547 (2014). 
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result, states would be unable to require employer contributions to a state 
retirement plan, although they should be able to require employers to 
facilitate payroll deduction contributions to a state retirement plan. 
  In addition, the federal tax code currently grants tax benefits for 
retirement savings in limited circumstances – either when an employer plan 
is utilized, or when a qualified individual retirement account is used.  As a 
result, if a state were to adopt a state-based retirement plan, it may not be 
able to take advantage of federal income tax preferences.  A state backstop 
retirement plan would not be an employer-provided plan, and therefore 
would be ineligible for existing federal tax benefits for employer plans.  
And while the state plan might be able to qualify as an IRA, structuring the 
plan in such a way would likely prohibit the use of a cash balance design,86 
and would only provide the lower tax benefits available to IRA holders.87 
  Still, there is some reason to believe that this is an area where 
states may be more interested and nimble than the federal government.  
Indeed, California has passed a law requiring employers to either sponsor a 
retirement plan or participate in a state-based retirement plan.88 That law, 
however, is effectively on hold until the state can get favorable ruling from 
the federal government on the tax and ERISA issues noted briefly above 
and described in more detail in Professor Zelinsky’s article in this issue.89 
 States could, of course, design a plan that avoids ERISA 
preemption and does not depend on federal tax benefits for its success.  As 
mentioned in the previous section regarding a federal backstop plan, a state 
plan could allow individuals to invest on a post-tax basis, with any gains 
then being taxed at capital gains rates when realized.  Alternatively, the 
state could offer state-tax benefits to attempt to offset, at least in part, the 
absent federal tax benefits.  For example, a state could exempt from its 
income tax retirement savings contributions regardless of whether such 
contributions were made to an employer-based or state-based plan.90  While 
this would help improve the tax advantage of the state plan, it would not 
                                                                                                                 
86 See id. 
87 See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671. 
88 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20139 (2013). 
89 See generally Zelinsky, supra note 85. 
90 While states often adhere to the federal definition of income for tax 
purposes, they are of course free to define income for state income tax purposes in 
any manner they see fit.  For an in-depth discussion of federal-state tax conformity, 
see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity to the Federal Tax Base, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013). 
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put participants in the same tax position they would be in if they 
participated in an employer plan.  A state could, however, offer a state 
matching contribution equal to the estimated value of the federal income 
tax benefit if the contribution had been made to an employer-plan.  Doing 
so could put the individual in the same position as she would have been in 
if federal income tax law treated employer and individual retirement 
savings equally, but it would obviously do so at a cost to state 
governments.  If a state were to expend money on a retirement plan through 
the use of state tax benefits it would likely want to address how to treat 
participants in the state plan who move to a different state either before or 
during retirement.  One possibility would be to have a claw back provision 
that would require repayment of the tax benefit upon losing state residency. 
On the whole, while states may be good laboratories for experiments in this 
area, existing federal law may make it difficult for states to meaningfully 
pursue retirement savings improvements. 
 
 3.  Which Plan Provider? 
 
 Regardless of whether the backstop retirement plan was established 
at the federal or state level, thought would need to be given to which entity 
would most appropriately administer the plan and any investment options.  
One approach would be to designate either a governmental agency or an 
independent agency to administer the plan.  For example, the California 
law establishing a state retirement plan for all workers allows the state to 
designate CALPERS (the California Public Employee Retirement System) 
as the plan administrator.91  Another approach would be to take a free 
market approach, and allow any licensed investment firm to offer a 
retirement plan structured around legal design and investment 
requirements. Providers could also be made subject to basic fiduciary 
duties with respect to participants’ accounts.  While this option involves 
less direct government action than the first proposal, it would also be in 
many ways harder to implement, and may cost participants more if fees are 
not very closely regulated.  If there were numerous providers for these 
plans, it would be difficult to auto-enroll participants, unless some entity 
wanted to take responsibility of assigning individuals to certain providers.  
In addition, it would complicate payroll deduction significantly, given that 
employers would be responsible for transferring contributions to many 
different providers instead of a single entity. 
                                                                                                                 
91 See CAL. GOV’T CODE Sec. 20139 (2013). 
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B.   CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO ALLOW STATE INNOVATION 
 
 There may not be political will at the federal level to implement a 
backstop retirement plan, and states may be hampered in their reform 
efforts by existing federal laws that constrain their options.  One available 
compromise would be for Congress to amend ERISA to allow state 
governments to require automatic enrollment in state retirement plans and 
allow employer contributions to such plans without triggering ERISA 
preemption. Doing so would significantly broaden states’ reform options.  
If this reform is perused, careful thought should be given to whether 
ERISA should apply to such state plans and, if so, whether any of its 
requirements should be modified.92 
 In addition to addressing the ERISA barriers to state action, 
Congress could also amend the tax code to provide tax benefits for state-
based plans that are equivalent to those afforded to private-employer plans.  
There would again be the issue of increased cost, but perhaps Congress 
would be willing to do so in order to see the results of state-based 
retirement plan experiments. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The system of retirement savings on which many Americans 
currently rely does not generate sufficient capital for most individuals to 
adequately replace their income in retirement.  While a widespread shift to 
401(k) plans has likely contributed to this outcome, this article has 
suggested that it is not 401(k) plans per se that are to blame, but rather a 
bad combination of flawed individual decision-making and poor employer 
plan design. The federal government could take a lesson from the ACA and 
create a universally available retirement plan designed to reflect the many 
lessons learned from behavioral economics about encouraging retirement 
savings.  If it is unwilling to do so, it could at the very least make it 
possible for states to meaningfully experiment with universal retirement 
savings options. 
 
                                                                                                                 
92 Historically there has been little political interest in subjecting state 
retirement plans to ERISA regulation.  See Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral, 
Federal Regulation of State Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption 
Revisited, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 291, 297 (2013). 
